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1 . Since the completion of this Comment several developments have transpired 
pertaining to Native American gaming within the State of California: 
1) A general confusion pertaining to what entity has the authority to sign compacts at 
the legislative level of state government. See generally Dan Bernstein, Wilson Signs Bill 
Allowing Indian Video Slot Games, But Prop. 5 on the November Ballot Could Give 
Tribes the Right to Operate More of the Machines, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 29, 
1998, at AS ( discussing the ratification of the Pala compacts, and the implications of 
Proposition 5); Mary Lynne Vellinga, Tribes' Gambling Pacts Ratified by Lawmakers, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 28, 1998, at Al (discussing the legislative ratification of the 
Pala and ten other compacts signed between California tribes and the State of 
California); Tom Gorman, Judge Rules Wilson Can't Regulate Casinos, Gambling, L.A. 
TIMES, June 26, 1998, at A3 (exemplifying the confusion within the State over who has 
the authority to ratify tribal-state compacts); Sam Delson, Gaming Compact Challenged, 
PRESS-ENTERPRISE, April 29, 1998, at A 7 (reporting that state legislators and gaming 
tribes sued Governor Wilson in an attempt to overturn the Pala compact); 
2) A general lack of consistency at the federal judicial level. See generally Christine 
Hanley, Judge Says Government Can't Take Indian Gaming Machines: The Federal 
Ruling Maintains the Status Quo While the State Continues Debating the Tribal Issue, 
ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 23, 1998, at B6 (discussing the different approaches that 
the United States District Courts are taking); David Rosenzweig, Judge Threatens Ban 
on Slots at Indian Casinos, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1998, at A3 (discussing United States 
District Court decision to bar slot machines on reservation if a tribal-state compact is not 
signed); 
3) The addition of tribes which have signed compacts. See generally Viejas Band 
Approves Compact to Keep its Gambling Machines, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 28, 1998, 
at D2 ( discussing the tribal feeling of duress to sign a compact or be shut down by the 
United States); Chet Barfield, Barona Agrees to Adopt Gaming Pact, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., July 24, 1998, at Al (discussing Barona's decision to sign a gaming compact); 
Sam Delson, Five Tribes Sign Casino Compacts With Wilson, Tribes From Riverside and 
San Bernardino Counties are not Among Those Agreeing to State Terms, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE, July 14, 1998, at A3 (discussing the differences in the compacts and the 
179 
referred to as the United States of America consisted of many cultures, 
made up of hundreds of individual autonomous tribes, each a sovereign 
nation with individual cultural traits including art, religion, language and 
sociopolitical organization.3 Early Native Americans are believed to 
have moved to the North American continent through Alaska as long as 
"twelve thousand to fifteen thousand years ago, and possibly long before 
that."4 The different Native American cultural groups were autonomous 
tribes from first arrival until the time of the non-Native American 
invasion. The impact the non-Native American invasion had on the 
Native Americans changed the way of life for a diverse number of tribes 
in many different ways, some of which will never be fully understood. 
Life for Native Americans was also changed in regards to gaming. 
During the period of time that Native Americans have inhabited North 
America, gaming was an integral part of their culture.5 Gaming was 
initially part of historical ceremonial life which eventually evolved into 
a bingo-type gaming that is now used as one type of economic 
development for certain tribes who cannot depend on the natural 
resources that were depleted by non-Native Americans.6 The history of 
Native American gaming has made the current gaming issue all the more 
important in understanding the necessity of gaming for contemporary 
Native Americans. 
The purpose of this comment is to illustrate how the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA)7 has compromised and is in contradiction to the 
relationship between the United States government and the Native 
American tribes of California, and what should be done to rectify that 
feeling of duress to sign that the tribes felt); 
4) Nevada's interest in Native American gaming in California seems to increase. See 
generally Mark Henry, Nevada Casinos Ante Up Against Prop. 5. $900,000 was Raised 
by June 30 to Fight California Initiative, State Records Show, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Aug. 
12, 1998, at A3 (discussing the effect that Native American gambling could have on 
Nevada); Ira Teinowitz, California Casino Vote Draws Big Ad Stakes: 'Anti' Coalition 
Seen Spending Up to $90 Mil, ADVERT. AGE, Aug. 3, 1998, at 16 (reviewing the 
financial battle over Proposition 5). 
2. The aboriginal people within the boundaries of the United States will be 
referred to generally in this comment as "Native Americans" because to list the different 
names of the separate tribes, and those tribes' cultures and traditions, would call for a 
separate comment. 
3. See CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN (1985) 
(providing a general historical and cultural overview of Native Americans). 
4. ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF AMERICA 37 (1991). 
5. See RALPH ANDREWS, INDIAN PRIMITIVE 59-61 (1960) (discussing Native 
American use of stick games in tribal ceremonies). 
6. See The History of Tribal Gaming (visited Sept. IO, 1998) <http://www2. 
dgsys.com/~niga/ history.html>. 
7. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). 
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relationship. 8 The comment will show that jurisdiction to control Native 
American gaming on reservations, which was transferred to the states by 
the federal government through the enactment of the IGRA, has 
compromised the purpose of the IGRA itself, which is to "promote tribal 
economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 
government."9 State government jurisdiction is contrary to the relation-
ship which has been developed between the Native American tribes and 
the United States government, as exemplified by case law characterizing 
the federal government as the guardian of Native American tribes, and 
the protective purpose behind that relationship. 10 
Part I will examine the general history of gaming within the Native 
American culture, and what that history translates into for contemporary 
California Native American tribes. Part I will also include a small 
sample of a letter written to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by the 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs of California discussing the removal of 
Native American tribes. That letter characterizes the mind-set of the 
federal government during the time of peak infringement on Native 
American sovereignty, and illustrates why gaming is one of the few 
economic options available to some of the tribes of California. The 
letter also demonstrates that neither the state nor federal governments 
have historically considered economic sufficiency when removing tribes 
from their land. 
In Part II, the legal relationship between Native American tribes and 
the United States Government will be defined by analyzing the language 
of the Constitution of the United States, case law, and statutory law. 
Upon analysis of the legal precedent, Part III will then evaluate the 
IGRA to establish a better understanding of what the IGRA does, and 
what the IGRA allows the states to do in contravention of legal 
precedent. In addition, Part III will cite some examples of tribal-state 
compacts from states other than California, and then fi nail y will take a 
8. Only one Native American tribe in California has compacted with the state, but 
the IGRA has worked to benefit tribes of other states such as Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Michigan and Connecticut. Native Americans on reservations in those states are building 
new houses, roads and community centers. Where government programs have failed, 
gaming has succeeded, taking Native Americans off welfare rolls and benefiting states 
through increased tax revenues. See Tribal Gaming: Myths and Facts (visited Sept. 10, 
1998) <http://www2.dgsys.com/~niga/myths.html>. 
9. 25 u.s.c. § 2701 (4) (1994). 
10. See infra Part II (explaining the history of case law and statutory law between 
the federal government and Native American tribes). 
,~, 
close look at the Pala compact, a recently signed compact between the 
Pala band of Native Americans, and the state of California. Part IV will 
show the benefits achieved by the Native American communities for 
themselves, as well as the benefits extended to surrounding non-Native 
American communities. Such benefits will illustrate that gaming is not 
only beneficial for the Native American communities involved in 
gaming, but also desirable for the entire population of the state of 
California. 
Part V will demonstrate the inconsistency between past legal decisions 
and the IGRA, discussed in Parts II and III, while Part VI will demon-
strate how attempts to resolve those inconsistencies could be handled, 
and are being handled through State or Federal Constitutional Amend-
ments, state ballot initiatives, the Secretary of the Interior's office, and 
through the compacting procedure encompassed in the IGRA. 
Upon analyzing the history of Native American culture, the relation-
ship between the federal government and the Native American tribes, 
and the current state of affairs on Native American reservation and trust 
lands, Part VII will conclude that to enable the Native American people 
of California to thrive once again, and to comply with the original 
purpose of the relationship between the Native American people and the 
federal government, Native Americans can, and must, be given the 
opportunity to live as sovereign nations. 
PART I 
SHORT HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURE AND GAMING 
WITHIN THE NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
Gaming in the Native American culture existed in North America long 
before the arrival of Europeans.u Gaming, such as the game of 
chenco, a game of sliding sticks and stones, is one of the oldest forms 
of recreation, and was played in the Southeast United States, before 
colonization. 12 Native American games were similar throughout North 
America, with "two basic kinds: games of chance and gambling, and 
games of skill and dexterity." 13 The games of chance and gambling 
11. See Tribal Gaming: Myths and Facts (visited Sept. 10, 1998) 
<http://www2.dgsys.com/-niga/ myths.html>. See generally WILLIAM BRANDON, 
INDIANS 42, 136 (1987); DOLAN H. EARGLE, JR., THE EARTH Is OUR MOTHER: A 
GUIDE To THE INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA, THEIR LOCALES AND HISTORIC SITES 38-39, 
90 (1986). 
12. BRANDON, supra note 11, at 136. 
13. WALDMM, supra note 3, at 50. 
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included "dice, marked sticks, guessing games, and hand games," 14 
Games in Native American culture such as stick games were played by 
certain tribes throughout history, 15 Indian gaming was originally part 
of tribal ceremonies or celebrations. 16 Now, however, gaming has 
become a viable and acceptable source of employment and revenue to 
some tribes who must depend on gaming in light of the fact that 
European and American settlement "[ destroyed] agrarian societies, 
kill[ed] the buffalo and forc[ed] American Indians onto remote, desolate 
reservations." 17 In order to overcome these travesties, gaming has 
evolved into another mechanism used by Native Americans for survival, 
cultural preservation and replenishing impoverished economies. 18 
Gaming sponsored by tribal governments on a large-scale started in 
early 1980. 19 Tribes in Florida and California began raising money by 
operating bingo games at the same time the state lotteries began to 
abound, but the tribes offered larger prizes. 20 The controversy over 
official gaming started with the 1979 decision in Seminole Tribe v. 
Butterworth.21 The court of appeals in Butterworth upheld a federal 
district court ruling that the Seminole Tribe of Florida could continue its 
bingo operations despite the State of Florida's opposition.22 The court 
of appeals decided that the tribe could conduct gaming without state 
interference because the federal government had never transferred 
jurisdiction to the State of Florida to impose its civil regulatory laws on 
Indian lands.23 The crucial case, though, was California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission lndians. 24 In Cabazan, the Supreme Court recognized 
the right of Indian tribes to conduct gaming without state interference. 
One year after the Cabazon decision, the IGRA was enacted."' 
14. Id. 
15. See ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 59-61. 
16. See id. 
17. The History of Tribal Gaming, supra note 6, at I. 
18. See id. 
I 9. See The History o_f Tribal Gaming, supra note 6, at I. 
20. See id. (illustrates that this was the beginning of state opposition to tribal 
gaming that allegedly competed with the state lotteries). 
21. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981). 
22. Id. at 312. 
23. Id. at 312-15. 
24. Cabazvn, 480 U.S. 202 (I 987) (holding that Congress did not grant states 
express consent to apply state gambling laws to Native Americans on reservations). 
25. See discussion infra Part III, contending that by enacting the IGRA, the federal 
government has failed to protect the sovereignty and economic development of the 
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Reflecting on the history of gaming in Native American communities 
provides an appreciation of the predicament of California Native 
Americans from the very beginning of their relationship with the federal 
government through the treaty process. The analysis is important to 
exemplify their necessary reliance on gaming at the reservations for 
sustenance of their traditional ways of life and economic development 
as they move into the twenty-first century. Historic documentation will 
show that the treaty process effectively forced the Native Americans of 
California to live where no one else wanted to live, and where sustaining 
a livelihood would, at that time, be nearly impossible. 26 The removal 
process consequently guaranteed the demise of many Native Americans 
that were removed to the infertile areas, with no way to sustain life 
through tribal traditions. With no other way to become economically 
sufficient after removal, the tribes have struggled to survive economical-
ly, and culturally. 27 Through gaming, which is rooted in tradition, 
tribes are again finally able to depend on traditional ways of life to 
sustain their own lives now and in the future. 28 
Historic documentation of the treaty process and the federal 
government's capability of furthering the goal of tribal self-sufficiency 
and self-government is one way to exemplify the United States 
government's treatment of Native Americans. A telling report written 
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Hon. L. Lea was submitted on 
May 11, 1852, from E. F. Beale, Esq., Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
for the State of California.29 In the report Mr. Beale expressed his 
views as to the merits of the treaties recently negotiated with the Native 
Americans of California.30 Mr. Beales' disdain for the Native Ameri-
cans was obvious by his comments pertaining to them. 31 At one point 
he refers to them as suspicious by nature, "although easily governed 
Native Americans of California from state interference. 
26. See ROBERT F. HEIZER, THE EIGHTEEN UNRATIFIED TREATIES OF 1851-1852 
BETWEEN THE CALIFORNIA INDIANS AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1972) 
(discussing the placement of Southern California Native American tribes). 
27. See WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 201 (discussing the social conditions of Native 
Americans on and off the reservations, including unemployment, poverty, and 
alcoholism). 
28. See infra Part IV ( discussing the tribal benefits of gaming). 
29. See HEIZER, supra note 26, at 19. A series of eighteen treaties were negotiated 
with 'tribes' of California Native Americans by three treaty Commissioners appointed 
by President Millard Fillmore and authorized by the United States Senate on September 
29. 1850. However, on July 8, 1852, the Senate refused to ratify them in executive 
session and ordered them filed under an injunction of secrecy which was not removed 
until January 18, 1905. Id. at I. 
30. Id. at 20. 
31. Id. at 20-25. 
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when [the Native Americans'] confidence has been obtained,"32 At 
another point, he refers to them as "savages" who should not be exposed 
to our citizens. 33 
Mr. Beale continues to write of two important considerations: first, 
"whether the Indians are to have any lands set apart for them," and 
second, "whether those already selected for them may be justly 
considered as suitable and appropriate."34 The first question of whether 
the Native Americans should have any lands at all, implies that if the 
government could take away land without a major Native American 
uprising, the federal government would not have reserved any of the 
Native American lands for the Native Americans; instead, the United 
States would have removed them by force or killed them off as had been 
customary during the same period in other parts of California. 35 Mr. 
Beale thought removal of the Native Americans over the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains impossible, and therefore was forced to reserve some land for 
them. 36 He found it equally impossible to move the Native Americans 
north, for the population of Native Americans was already "overflowing" 
in the north,37 and moving them to the south would interfere with 
European emigration.38 Considering the difficulty in removing the 
Native Americans from Southern California, Mr. Beale then gave a 
telling commentary on the land reserved for them. 
With reference to the character or quality of the land reserved by the treaties 
for the Indians, I can only speak from personal observation with regard to those 
selected in the southern portion of the State. They are such as only a half-
starved and defenceless [sic] people would have consented to receive, and, as 
a general thing, embrace only such lands as are unfit for mining or agricultural 
purposes. 39 
He went on to say that "[t]he reservations made in the southern 
portion of the State are undoubtedly composed of the most barren and 
32. Id. at 20. 
33. HEIZER, supra note 26, at 22. 
34. Id. at 20. 
35. See JOSEPHY, supra note 4, at 145. (He explains that between 1849 and 1859, 
estimates showed that some 70,000 California Native Americans were killed by non-
Indians, or wiped out by disease. Miners and settlers ruthlessly massacred the Native 
Americans, and destroyed food stores during the Gold Rush). 
36. See HEIZER, supra note 26, at 21. 




sterile lands to be found in California ... in no case of reservations 
under these treaties, will the lands reserved compare favorably with the 
agricultural and valuable portions of the State."40 Mr. Beale's letter 
illustrates very effectively that the federal government was neither 
concerned for the self-sufficiency of the tribes, nor worried about 
whether those tribes could or would ever become financially indepen-
dent-a pattern which has apparently resurfaced through the grant of 
power to state governments through the IGRA. 
Because many of the lands to which Native Americans were removed 
were generally considered uninhabitable and incapable of any type of 
economic sustenance, the federal government had to choose whether to 
help the tribes survive, or simply leave them to die. It would seem, 
therefore, that given this history, the federal and state governments 
would want to enable the tribes to do whatever was legal under federal 
law to allow them to sustain themselves. The IGRA is one attempt to 
accomplish this goal. Its purposes, as set forth in the statute, are to 
promote tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 
governments.41 
Bearing in mind this history, statutes and case law are also enlighten-
ing to show where the relationship between the tribes, the state, and the 
federal government stood in the past, before the enactment of the IGRA. 
PART II 
THE HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIVE 
AMERICANS AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
The historic relationship between the Native Americans and the United 
States government is important to demonstrate why state governments 
should and do have limited power to regulate whether individual Native 
American tribes may choose to involve themselves in gaming.42 
40. HEIZER, supra note 26, at 23. 
41. 25 u.s.c. § 2701(4) (1994) 
42. The author is aware that the treatment of Native Americans throughout history 
by the United States government has been prominently negative, but the author is 
choosing to focus on the positive relationship between the tribes and the United States 
in order to represent that a positive relationship is not only possible, but is also in the 
best interest of all parties. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., & CLIFFORD M. LITTLE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 15-21 (1983) (discussing the policy of 
termination by the United States government toward the Native Americans from 1945-
1961); see also FELIX S. COHEN. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 152-80 (1982 
ed.) (discussing the policy of termination by the United States government). See 
generally A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 349 (1970) 
(describing termination as "the most concerted drive against Indian property and Indian 
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Generally, state law does not apply to Indian affairs within the territory 
of an Indian tribe, unless Congress consents.43 This historical analysis 
will also illustrate the jurisdictional powers that the United States 
government has over Indian country.44 
A. The Constitutional Bases for Protecting Native Americans 
The Constitution of the United States makes one direct and two 
indirect references to Native American tribes.45 The direct reference to 
the tribes is in the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power 
to regulate commerce with the "Indian Tribes."46 The first indirect 
reference to tribes exists in the power of the President, with the consent 
of the Senate, to make treaties.47 Although no express language 
concerning the Native American tribes was used, past treaties between 
the United States government and Native American tribes exemplified 
the applicability of the Treaty Clause.48 A principle foundation for 
survival since the removals following the acts of 1830 and the liquidation of tribes and 
reservations following 1887"). See also WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing the 
termination policy of the federal government where tribes such as the Menominee of 
Wisconsin were terminated as a guise of freedom from government intervention, but an 
underlying motive for various white interests and their allies in Congress centered around 
the acquisition of timber on Indian lands). 
43. COHEN, supra note 42, at 259. 
44. The term "Indian Country" is defined as: 
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependant 
Indian communities within the borders of the United States ... and (c) all 
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § l 151(a) (1994). 
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The 
reference to "Indians not Taxed," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. 
Amend. XIV§ 2, is no longer relied on. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. I (1956) 
(moving away from the idea that Indians are non-taxable, and relying on subsequent 
statutory law). 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have [p]ower ... [t]o 
regulate [c]ommerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian Tribes. . .. "). The Commerce Clause is the only express clause in the 
Constitution which the federal government has used to justify its power over tribes. 
47. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties ... "). 
48. Id. (The author expects that the reader will take 'judicial notice" of the fact 
that in the past the United State has entered into treaties with Native American tribes). 
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federal power over Indian affairs has been the Treaty Clause which 
grants exclusive authority to the federal government to enter into 
treaties.49 
The second indirect reference to tribes exists in the power that 
Congress has to dispose of and make rules and regulations pertaining to 
property belonging to the United States.50 The United States govern-
ment holds Indian lands in trust; the United States government, therefore, 
has the power to make rules and regulations pertaining to those lands 
which Congress expressly reserved the right to control.51 This clause 
has been considered an additional source of authority over Indian 
lands.52 
Not only does Constitutional language tend to show that the United 
States government was aware that the Native American tribes needed 
special protection, but the references to property controlled by Congress 
also illustrates that the federal government needed to specifically protect 
the Native American tribal land.53 This language and provisions 
demonstrate an assumption by the Framers that only the federal 
government could provide the needed protection to the tribes. This 
federalism is further exemplified in the case law and statutes in the 
following section. As one commentator wrote, 
Court opinions most often refer to the Indian Commerce Clause, [ and] the 
Treaty Clause ... in discussing the source of federal power over Indian affairs 
.... For most purposes it is sufficient to conclude that there is a single 'power 
over Indian affairs,' an amalgam of the several specific constitutional 
provisions. 54 
B. Protecting Native Americans Through Case Law 
In order to explicate how the courts have viewed the relationship 
between the United States government and the Native American tribes, 
a condensed examination of case law is helpful.55 In Cherokee v. 
Georgia,56 the Court made clear that Native Americans were to be 
considered "domestic dependent nations" under the protection of the 
49. COHEN, supra note 42, at 207. 
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have [p]ower to dispose 
of and make all needful [r]ules and [r]egulations respecting the [t]erritory or other 
[p]roperty belonging to the United States ... ") [hereinafter Property Clause]. 
51. Id. 
52. COHEN, supra note 42, at 209. 
53. See supra note 50. 
54. COHEN, supra note 42, at 208. 
55. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
56. Cherokee, 30 U.S. I (1831). 
188 
[VOL. 35: 179, 1998] Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
federal government, 57 The case arose when the state of Georgia 
enacted laws to divide Cherokee territory among several counties in 
Georgia.58 The newly enacted laws also invalidated Cherokee laws and 
made any attempt of the Cherokee people to form their own government 
a criminal offense.59 Chief Justice Marshall determined that the tribes 
were "ward[s]," and that the federal government was their "guardian."60 
The Cherokee v, Georgia case launched the protective relationship that 
the federal government would assume over tribes. One year later, the 
Marshall Court put forth the proposition that states had no power in 
Native American country.61 Georgia authorities arrested missionaries 
for violating a state law which required non-Native Americans to obtain 
a license from the state Governor if non-Native Americans wanted to 
live in Cherokee territory, 62 Chief Justice Marshall reflected on the 
history of the relationship between the federal government and the 
Native Americans and concluded that the Cherokees were not governed 
by Georgia law,63 and therefore the Georgia authorities had no power 
to arrest the missionaries. 64 
Another set of decisions protected Native American rights by setting 
limits on the federal government's power, In Lane v. Pueblo of Santa 
Rosa,65 the Court found that the Secretary of Interior could not dispose 
of lands claimed by a member of the Pueblo Tribe in the same manner 
that he could dispose of other public lands, The case lends itself to the 
argument that the federal government had a duty to protect Native 
American lands. 
Similarly, in Cramer v, United States, the Court upheld the federal 
government's duty to protect Native American lands from encroachment 
by striking down a statute that purported to convey certain legal 
subdivisions of land to the Central Pacific Railway Company which 
failed to protect the Native Americans right of occupancy.66 The Court 
57. Id. at 17. 
58. Id. at 7. 
59. See id. at 7-8. 
60. Id. at 17. 
61. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). See also supra note 44 
(defining Native American country). 
62. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 537. 
63. Id. at 561. 
64. Id. at 596. 
65. Lane, 249 U.S. 110 (1919). 
66. Cramer, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923). 
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held that the statute "would be contrary to the whole spirit of the 
traditional American policy toward these dependent wards of the 
nation,"67 coming to this conclusion with reliance on "settled govern-
mental policy."68 In Williams v. Lee, the Court held that state law may 
intrude on Native American tribes only where essential tribal relations 
were not involved.69 Essential tribal relations could be any act that 
"would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation 
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of Indians to govern 
themselves. "70 The Court stated that "absent governing Acts of 
Congress, the question had always been whether the state action 
infringed on the right of reservation Native Americans to make their own 
laws, and be governed by them."71 This line of cases determined the 
protective role which the federal government was required to take when 
states attempted to interfere with tribal relations. 
The Court continued to treat the federal government as a fiduciary to 
the Native American tribes. When funds which were supposed to be 
paid to individual tribal members were instead paid to the tribal 
government by the terms of a treaty, and misappropriated by the tribal 
government, the Court held that the United States government has a 
fiduciary relationship with a tribe, not simply a contract, through their 
treaty.72 Additionally, the Court, protecting the tribes in McClanahan 
v. Arizona State Tax Commission, specified that state law could intrude 
only if there was no interference with tribal self-government, and only 
if non-Native Americans were involved.73 The McClanahan holding 
negated an Arizona state law which applied an individual income tax to 
Navajos with respect to income derived from reservation sources.74 
The Court felt that state interests at stake must be sufficient to justify 
assertion of state authority. These cases seemingly seek to protect 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
70. Id. at 223. 
71. Id. at 220. 
72. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) 
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the Government is 
something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self-
imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and 
numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations 
of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of 
those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged 
by the most exacting fiduciary standards. 
Id. at 296-97. 
73. McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973). 
74. Id. at 164. 
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financial interests of the tribes and to assure continued economic 
stability.75 
The fiduciary relationship rationale was further developed when the 
federal government failed to properly manage certain funds held in trust 
for a tribe, thereby breaching the fiduciary duty to the tribe. 76 A 
district court quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Nation77 
when it defined the trust responsibility between the United States 
government and Native Americans as having charged the United States 
government with "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and 
trust."7s In 1976, the Court held that, contrary to Public Law 280,79 
states did not have general legislative jurisdiction over Native American 
lands, but rather only adjudicatory jurisdiction over contracts between 
Native Americans on Native American lands.so Therefore, because of 
this limitation in the state of Minnesota, Public Law 280 would forbid 
an assessment of state and local property tax against personal property 
owned by a Native American in Native American country.s1 
More recently, the Court went as far as to hold that the federal 
government has a fiduciary duty to Native Americans, and that the 
75. There have been subsequent decisions which could be seen as going against 
this decision. See Strate v. A-I Contractors. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (discussing that 
when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a 
federally granted right-of-way over Indian reservation land, a civil action against 
allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory 
governance; absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of 
nonmembers driving on the State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction 
in such cases). 
76. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 
(N.D. Cal. 1973). 
77. See supra note 72 (defining the trust obligation). 
78. Id. at 1243 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. at 297 (1942)). 
79. Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (extending state civil and criminal 
jurisdiction to Native American land in five specified states: California, Nebraska, 
Minnesota (except the Red Lake reservation), Oregon (except Wann Springs reserva-
tion), and Wisconsin (except the Menominee reservation)). Public Law 280 essentially 
allows states to interfere with tribal jurisdiction when a law is criminal/prohibitory, 
versus civil/regulatory. See generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and 
the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 
(1997) (discussing the rationale behind Public Law 280). 
80. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); COHEN, supra note 42, at 177 
("[T]he Supreme Court held that although [Public Law] 280 provided for substitution of 
state for federal judicial forums over some subjects, it did not confer state 'general civil 
regulatory powers' over Indian lands."). 
81. Id. 
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government should be liable for damages upon breach of that duty. 82 
One can infer that the Court, in these cases, viewed the fiduciary 
relationship between the federal government and the tribes seriously 
enough to allow damages. The Court went on to hold that the Tucker 
Act83 and the Indian Tucker Act84 waived the sovereign immunity of 
the United States for such claims. 
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, the Court 
referred to tribes as sovereign nations which are free to act unless some 
federal intrusion has affirmatively modified that sovereignty.85 The 
Court indicated that when there is a question of tribal jurisdiction, 
federal law determines whether any limitation exists preventing the tribe 
from acting, rather than whether federal law exists permitting the tribe 
to act. 86 Therefore, the tribes were free to act unless prohibited by the 
federal government. Furthermore, if the federal government is to 
intrude, McClanahan made clear that any additionally assigned state 
power could not interfere with tribal self-govemment.87 
The final example of the powerlessness of a state pertaining to Native 
American lands is illustrated in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians which held that states were preempted from regulating tribal 
gambling operations on reservations. 88 California assumed criminal 
jurisdiction over Indian reservations under Public Law 28089 before the 
law was amended to require the tribes' consent. California therefore 
threatened to apply criminal sanctions against the Cabazon and Morongo 
Bands of Mission Indians when they opened a bingo hall and card hall 
at which casino-type card games were played.90 The tribes sought a 
declaratory judgment stating that California had no power to apply its 
statutes on the reservation, and the district court granted the tribes' 
82. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983). 
83. 28 u.s.c. § 1491 (1948). 
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment 
upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, 
or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon 
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or 
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 
Id. § 149l(a)(l). 
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1949) (providing tribal claimants the same access to the 
Court of Claims provided to individual claimants by 28 U.S.C. § 1491). 
85. National Farmers, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
86. Id. at 852-53. 
87. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973). 
88. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). The case was brought in a Public Law 280 
state and therefore application of the case may be limited to states utilizing Public Law 
280. 
89. See supra note 79. 
90. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 205. 
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motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the decision as did the Supreme Court.91 
The Supreme Court in Cabazon allowed tribes to conduct casino-style 
gaming as well as bingo.92 The Court rejected California's argument 
that its bingo statute was a criminal law. Instead, the Court found "that 
California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo 
in particular, since California permits a substantial amount of gambling 
activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its 
state lottery."93 Therefore, the majority decided that since California 
regulated rather than prohibited gambling, the state was prevented from 
asserting its jurisdiction over the tribes' gaming activities.94 One year 
after the Cabazon decision, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was 
passed. 
PART III 
THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT (IGRA)95 
The phrase within the United States Constitution that states that "[t]he 
Congress shall have the [p]ower ... [t]o regulate [c]ommerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
Tribes,"96 codifies the United States government's sole responsibility 
for trade with the Native American tribes. 
Article II, section two, clause two states that, "[the President] shall 
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties ... "97 a power that has been exercised throughout history. 98 
In addition, the language in Article IV, section three, clause two- "The 
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
91. Id. at 202-03. 
92. Id. at 221. 
93. Id. at 210. 
94. Id. 
95. See generally Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An 
Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 796 (1994) (an extensive overview of the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act). 
96. See supra note 45, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
97. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
98. See generally DA YID H. GETCHES, ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 83 (] 993) 
( discussing treaties generally). 
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Regulations respecting the [t]erritory or other [p]roperty belonging to the 
United States ... "99 -furthers the intent of the United States govern-
ment to control all "the territory," impliedly grants Congress power to 
regulate Native Americans on Native American lands. 100 
In addition to the United States Constitutional references to Native 
American tribes, the voluminous case law101 unequivocally relies on 
Congress, not the states, to regulate Native Americans on Native 
American lands. That same case law has made equally clear that states 
do not have the power to regulate Native Americans on Native American 
land, when there is no mention of states having any power over Native 
Americans in the Constitution. 102 To the contrary, in McClanahan, in 
order for a state to justify an assertion of state authority, there had to be 
a lack of interference with tribal self-government, and non-Native 
Americans must be involved. 103 Why then would Congress give the 
states powers that are inconsistent with past law, such as those encom-
passed in the IGRA?104 
The IGRA divides gaming into three classes. 105 Class I includes 
"social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of 
Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection 
with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations."106 Class I gaming is regulated 
by the tribe. 107 Class II games include bingo played for prizes or 
money, pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other 
games similar to bingo, if the games are played in the same location of 
the bingo games. 108 Class II also includes card games that are autho-
rized by state law or not prohibited by state law, which must be played 
in conformity with those laws as to hours of operation and pot sizes. 109 
Class II is problematic because IGRA mandates that Class II games be 
authorized by state law; therefore, state laws which allow card rooms in 
California, allow tribes to have card rooms on reservations. 110 Finally, 
99. See supra note 45, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
100. COHEN, supra note 42, at 209. 
101. See supra Part II. 
102. See generally Public Law 280, supra note 79 (Public Law 280 only gives the 
state power to prohibit criminal acts, if the state prohibits those acts criminally, not the 
power to regulate civil acts). See also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987) (discussing California's allowance of lotteries, parimutuel 
gambling and bingo) 
103. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164. 
104. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). 
105. Id. 
106. See id. § 2703( 6 ). 
107. See id. § 27JO(a)(i). 
108. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(i)(I-III) (1994). 
109. See id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(I-II). 
I JO. See id. § 2710(b)(l). 
194 
[VOL. 35: 179, 1998] Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Class III games, the most controversial class, encompass all forms of 
gambling not listed in Classes I or II, 111 such as lotteries, parimutuel 
wagering, 112 casino games, slot machines, electronic facsimiles of 
games of chance and banking card games. Class III games not only 
have to meet the same requirements as Class II gaming, but, completely 
contrary to the historical relationship between the state government and 
the tribes, the states and the tribes are required to form a compact 
essentially giving a state regulatory control of whether a tribe can enter 
into the most profitable class of gaming. 113 In California, for example, 
Governor Wilson and Attorney General Dan Lungren have decided to 
disallow electronic gaming on reservation casinos, while allowing 
electronic lottery games in the state. 114 
The motivations of Congress in giving the states such great power are 
contained in the "findings" section of the IGRA, 115 where Congress 
expressed concern with the revenue-producing aspects of tribal gaming, 
the federal government's ability to review contracts related to the 
gaming, as well as the federal government's lack of clear standards or 
regulations involving gaming. 116 In the past, tribes regulated gaming 
activities by their own police powers, taking violators to court when 
necessary. 117 Congress also set forth the principal goal of federal 
Native American policy to "promote tribal economic development, tribal 
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government."118 In an attempt to 
clarify the relationship between the federal government and the Native 
Americans, the section provides that, "Indian tribes have the exclusive 
right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity 
also must not specifically prohibited by Federal law."119 However, the 
section continues and is inconsistent with past case law, past federal 
111. See id. § 2703(8). 
112. Parimutuel is "a system of betting on races in which those backing the winners 
divide, in proportion to their wagers, the total amount bet, minus a percentage for the 
track operators, taxes etc. 2. [A] machine for recording such bets and computing payoffs; 
totalizator", WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1033 
(2d College ed. 1982). 
113. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994). 
114. Alan Bersin, Resolving the Indian Gaming Problem, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
June 26, 1996, at B7. 
115. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994). 
116. See id. § 2701(1-3). 
117. See supra note 19. 
118. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (1994). 
119. See id., § 270 I (5). 
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policy, as well as clause IV of the same section, by stating that the 
gaming activity also must not violate state law or public policy. 120 By 
passing the IGRA in its current form, the federal government has 
ignored the historical problems between states and tribes. 121 Addition-
ally, the federal government has assumed that the promotion of tribal 
sovereignty could be accomplished by giving states the right to regulate 
reservation activity, which is the heart of tribal self-sufficiency, and 
strong tribal government. 
The next pertinent section is the "Declaration of Policy" section, 
which explains the purpose of the IGRA. 122 The first clause is self-
explanatory: "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by 
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 123 The second clause 
notions protecting the tribe from organized crime and other outside 
influences which could divert funds from the tribe, or hinder the fair and 
honest operation of the gaming industry on tribal lands. 124 The fear 
of organized crime was cited by concerned states despite Sen. McCain 
testifying that "[b]oth the Department of Justice and the FBI have 
repeatedly testified before the Committee on Indian Affairs and have 
indicated that there is not any substantial criminal activity of any kind 
associated with Indian gaming."125 This testimony should put any 
fears of criminal activity to rest. In the third and final clause, Congress 
asserts authority to establish laws, and establishes the National Indian 
Gaming Commission for the protection of gaming as a means of 
generating tribal revenue. 126 Nowhere in the purpose section does 
Congress address state authority, having only provided the federal 
government power over Indian lands. Since the IGRA allows states to 
compact with tribes, some benefits to certain tribes may be obtained if 
the compacting agreements are made through good faith, arms-length 
negotiations. 
120. Id. 
121. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 515 (1832) (generally discussing how the 
state of Georgia treated the Cherokee people). 
122. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994). 
123. See id. § 2702(1). 
124. See id. § 2702(2). 
125. 140 CONG. REC. Sl4, 729-30 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Sen. 
McCain). 
126. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (1994). 
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A. State Governor and Legislative Treatment of the 
IGRA in Other States 
Governors from across the country have demonstrated successful 
leadership pertaining to the Native American gaming issue. 127 Gover-
nor Lowell Weicker of Connecticut granted two Native American tribes 
a casino monopoly, after getting support from local governments. 128 
"The Pequot Tribe [through the compacting process] promised the state 
25 percent of casino income or a minimum of $100 million annually for 
so long as it was granted a statewide monopoly." 129 Governor Finney 
of Kansas vetoed a bill that would have outlawed all casino gam-
bling. 130 Governor Finney felt that the bill blatantly discriminated 
against Native American people. 131 Governor Finney finally negotiated 
a compact with the Kickapoo Nation authorizing a large-scale casino, 
although the Attorney General of Kansas argued that the Governor 
lacked authority to establish a compact, because a compact was law 
requiring legislative approval. 132 The Kansas Supreme court agreed, 
and held that legislative approval was required in the compacting 
process. 133 
In Arizona, Governor Symington and Secretary of the Interior Bruce 
Babbitt, compromised with two tribes in Arizona to allow certain 
amounts of Las Vegas-style slot-machines, putting a cap of four hundred 
machines for smaller tribes, and thirteen hundred for larger tribes. 134 
This compact was agreeable to both the Governor, and the tribes, but the 
state legislature refused to repeal a ban on casinos as agreed upon in the 
compact, which hindered the entire process. 135 
Questions about who has the power under the IGRA to compact, the 
legislature or the Governor, whether states should have the power, and 
127. Don F. Hadwiger, State Governors and American Indian Casino Gambling: 
Defining State-Tribal Relationships, SPECTRUM: THE J. OF STATE GOVT., Fall 1996, at 
16. 




132. Hadwiger, supra note 127, at 21. 
I 33. Id. 
134. Id. at 22. 
135. Id. 
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whether it makes sense not to compact, continue to cloud the IGRA. 
The above examples characterize state confusion as to who can even 
sign the compact, and if compacting with one tribe is sufficient as 
pertaining to other tribes that may be a different size, or in a different 
location, which is all the more reason to leave the decisions in the hands 
of the tribes themselves. 
B. The Pala Compact 
A current example of the confusion that state compacts bring about, 
and the animosity that develops between the state and tribes, and 
between different tribes, is exemplified in the only compact that 
Governor Pete Wilson of California has been willing to negotiate, the 
"Pala compact." 136 Governor Wilson decided that he would finally 
compact with a small non-gaming tribe in Southern California. 137 
After negotiating for seventeen months, a token compact was signed on 
March 8, 1998, allocating a pool of electronic gaming devices to each 
of California's tribes. 138 
The compact allocates 19,900 gaming devices to each of the 104 
California tribes. 139 The allocation will allot each tribe one hundred 
and ninety-nine games, with the ability of remote non-gaming tribes to 
sell their allotments for $5,000 a game per year to gaming tribes. 140 
The agreement also allows the state to enforce state and local land-use 
planning standards, labor standards, and environmental standards on 
reservation lands. 141 It will require tribes to reach agreement with 
county officials on mitigation of public health and safety effects, 
building standards and environmental impact caused by gambling outside 
the boundaries of a reservation. 142 In addition, the compact would 
allow advisory votes by cities and counties that could effectively result 
in the re-negotiation of a compact. 143 The compact also forces tribes 
to give employees state workers compensation protection, state 
136. James P. Sweeney, Wilson, Tribe to Sign Pact on Gaming: Pala Deal 
Designed as a State Model, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 6, 1998, at A3 [herinafter 
State Model]. See generally Robert Smith and Paula Lorenzo, Exercising Sovereignty 
Does Not Undermine It. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 13, I 998, at BS (tribal leaders 
voicing displeasure with other tribes opposition to the Pala compact). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. James P. Sweeney, Governor, Pala Indians Agree on Gaming Pact: Other 
Tribes Get Deadline to Sign Up or Negotiate, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 7, 1998, 
at A I [hereinafter Deadline]. 
140. Id. 
141. Sweeney, State Model, supra note 136. 
142. Sweeney, Deadline, supra note 139. 
143. Id. 
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unemployment insurance, and disability insurance, as well as g1vmg 
employees the right to collective bargaining if they agree not to 
strike. 144 All tribes, whether involved in the compacting process or 
not, must agree to enter into a compact identical to the Pala compact, or 
shut down all existing machines, and go to the bargaining table with the 
state, who would then waive its constitutional immunity from lawsuits 
over bad-faith bargaining. 145 
This particular agreement caused some alarm within the Native 
American community during the negotiation period. 146 Tribal Chair-
man Anthony Pico of the Viejas tribe expressed his concern that his tribe 
was not involved with the negotiations and that the Pala tribe has no 
right to negotiate concessions for other tribes. 147 He went on to state 
that what may be a good agreement for Pala may "bankrupt" the Viejas 
tribe. 148 The compact between Wilson and Pala will cause problems 
between the tribes, forcing them to fight each other for the limited 
devices. 149 This compact could effectively create internal tribal 
divisions, as well as divisions between the tribes, an outcome that 
ironically may be a boon to Wilson who is acutely aware of the $20 
million fund which gaming tribes have accumulated to campaign for 
legalization of the electronic games in question. 150 The concern 
expressed during the negotiations for the compact came to light just 
three days after the compact was signed. 151 Thirty-two of the thirty-
nine gaming tribes rejected the Pala compact. 152 Daniel Tucker, 
chairman of the California Nevada Indian Gaming Association, referring 
to the states compact, stated, "[t]hey've put us in a situation where it's 
144. What the Gaming Compact Does, SAN DIEGO UN!ON-TRIB., Mar. 7, 1998, at 
Al. 
145. Chet Barfield, Governor, Pala Indians Agree on Gaming Pact: State's Pact 
With Pala May Have Dealt Some Casinos a Losing Hand, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Mar. 7, 1998, at Al. 
146. James P. Sweeney & Chet Barfield, Pala Gaming Deal with State Near at 
Hand; Landmark Compact Stirs Controversy Among Tribes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 




150. Sweeney, State Model, supra note 136. 
151. James P. Sweeney, Indian Alliance Rejects State's Gambling Pact: Tribes Gird 
for Fight Over Ballot Initiative, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 11, 1998, at Al 
[herinafter Alliance Rejection]. 
152. Id. 
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almost like they want to divide and conquer us again. . . . We're not 
going to be divided and conquered anymore."153 Tucker and Mary 
Ann Andreas, tribal chair of the Morongo Tribe, voiced concern that 
most tribes were being asked to accept a compact that they were largely 
excluded from, after promises were broken relating to being kept 
informed of continuing negotiations and being given the opportunity to 
ratify the compact. 154 They also related their concerns about the 
incursion on tribal sovereignty that the 19,900 machine cap will 
cause. 155 Six days after the signing of the compact, Chairman of the 
Viejas tribe, Anthony Pico, voiced his concern pertaining to the control 
that the compact gives to cities and counties. 156 Chairman Pico is 
willing to work with the county, but only on a government to govern-
ment basis. 157 
Mike Connolly, environmental director and tribal council officer for 
the Campo Indian Band, stated that because the compact would subject 
tribes to the California Environmental Quality Act, the tribes land-use 
and planning decisions would be under the state's jurisdiction. 158 This 
is a disconcerting proposition when historically local governments have 
shown tribal governments little respect in the area of land management 
and planning. 159 For example, when hearings were held designating 
Highway 94 as a scenic highway, two miles of which are on the Campo 
reservation, Campo representatives were not even invited. 160 In 
another instance of tribal-local government relations, the tribe was never 
consulted when a waste-transfer station was placed right next to the 
Campo reservation. 161 
Tribal entities are not the only ones concerned about the Pala compact. 
County Supervisor Dianne Jacob realizes that tribes have been treated 
unfairly in the past, and stated that it was unfortunate that tribes were 




156. Chet Barfield, Indians Say Gaming Pact Usurps Their Sovereignty, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 14, 1998, at Al [herinafter Sovereignty Usurption]. But see Chet 
Barfield, Pala Tribe Defends Gambling Compact; Eighteen Page Document Rebuts 
Criticism Point by Point. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 28, 1998, at B3 [hereinafter 
Rebuttal]. 




161. Barfield, Sovereignty Usurption, supra note 156. 
162. Id. 
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What this compact appears to be is an agreement with a non-gaming 
tribe, agreeing to the use of a small number of machines, which are still 
in development and may not be available for months, 163 The machines 
are being called an instant lottery device, and are being developed by a 
company in Reno, Nevada, 164 The machines will have gamblers play 
against each other, instead of playing against the house, as do the 
existing video slots, 165 This type of agreement is anything but a "good 
faith" negotiation or all tribes would have been comfortable coming to 
the negotiation table, and Wilson would not be attempting to force the 
compact on all tribes statewide, George Forman, an attorney for the 
Sycuan band of Native Americans, describes the individual sovereignty 
that tribes hold apart from one another, when he states, "[t]he state of 
California would not blindly accept something the state of Colorado 
negotiated," 166 If any interference is to take place it should only be by 
the federal government States should take a step back, and look at the 
positive benefits that tribal gaming could, and does, bring to them, 
PART IV 
THE BENEFITS OF NATIVE AMERICAN GAMING OPERATIONS TO 
TRIBES AND TO SURROUNDING CALIFORNIA NON-NATIVE AMERICAN 
COMMUNITIES 
Native American gaming has had a positive effect on the lives of 
Native American people on reservations, and also benefitted the lives of 
non-Native Americans in surrounding communities, 
A, The Effect of Gaming on Native American Reservation Life 
Economic success can have a positive effect on every aspect of life, 
Economic development due to gaming improves community services, the 
quality of education and health services, and allows for the development 
163. Sweeney, State Model, supra note 136. 
164. Sweeney, Deadline, supra note 139. 
165. Id. 
166. Sweeney & Barfield, supra note 146. 
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of infrastructure including investments into non-gaming industry. 167 
"The principle objective is to encourage new business ventures and jobs 
by expanding player alternatives to gambling." 168 Tribes have delved 
into such businesses as golf courses and hotels to accomplish economic 
development. 169 Some community leaders have realized that reserva-
tion gaming is good for the tribes. In a 1995 article, Republican Jan 
Goldsmith, assemblyman from the 75th District of California, stated that 
the tribes gaming has reduced their "traditionally high unemployment 
rates to zero, thus freeing many of their members from the public 
assistance rolls and the public from the tax burden to support them." 170 
At the time Mr. Goldsmith wrote his article, the tribes had already spent 
$4.5 million for roads, education, housing, health care, fire protection 
and related social services for their members. 171 Mr. Goldsmith 
succinctly stated that, "[r]eservation gaming has empowered tribes to 
become full members of the larger community while retaining their 
sovereignty and unique heritage." 172 Lawmakers from across the state 
of California realize that the Native American "gambling operations 
provide jobs and revenue for Indian tribes, which are consistently one of 
the poorest segments of society, and for the surrounding areas." 173 
Additionally, the gaming industry has also facilitated a university 
degree program in gaming at D-Q University, California's Native 
American community college. 174 The program was the idea of Paula 
Lorenzo who noticed the small numbers of Native American managers 
on the floor of the Rumsey Rancherias Central Valley casino. 175 The 
goal of the program is to teach Native Americans more about the gaming 
industry, and to better understand, develop, and manage tribal gam-
ing. 176 One student at D-Q felt that in addition to giving tribal 
members the opportunity to learn more about the industry, the further 
education of casino management could help avoid the bitter disputes that 
167. Gary C. Anders, The Indian Gaming Regulaton Act and Native American 
Development, 6 INT'L POLICY REV. 84-86 (1996). 
168. Id. at 85. 
169. Id. 
170. Jan Goldsmith, Tribal Gaming is Good for Everyone, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Oct. 26, 1995, at B 15. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. David Safford, Lawmakers Question Wisdom of Order to Pull Plug on 
Electronic Gambling, LEGI-SLATE NEWS SERVICE, April 21, 1997, at I. 
174. Bill Ainsworth, Casino U. A Good Bet For Tribes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Nov. 23, 1997, at A3 (D-Q University provides Native American language classes, and 
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sometimes divide gaming tribes. 177 Gaming has proven to be a 
catalyst for social change as well as for new ideas, which will facilitate 
the development of Native American tribes that choose to delve into the 
world of gaming. Nine tribes have recently joined together to form an 
alliance to push for the expansion of tribal governments and economic 
development, and to strengthen laws which require the return of sacred 
objects. 178 
B. The Effect of Gaming on Non-Native American Communities 
Gaming has also been a catalyst for improvements to surrounding non-
Native American communities. Tribes across California employ 
approximately 10,000 people from surrounding communities, both Native 
Americans and non-Native-Americans. 179 Native American gaming at 
the Barona, Sycuan and Viejas reservations in San Diego County has 
created more than 2,800 jobs. 180 In San Bernardino County, the San 
Manuel tribe has generated more than 1,200 jobs, making them the 
largest private-sector employer in the county. 181 Riverside County is 
home to the Cabazon tribe that created more than 580 jobs, making them 
one of the county's largest employers. 182 The Santa Ynez casino 
generated 350 new jobs in Santa Barbara County, 183 and in Yolo 
County, the Rumsey Tribe is the largest employer in Western Yolo 
County, employing 520 people. 184 Finally, the Jackson tribe, Amador 
County's second-largest employer, created more than 295 jobs. 185 
Hand and hand with the new economic force are of course the millions 
of dollars in payroll, and the accompanying payroll tax and revenue. 
177. Id. at AS. 
178. Bill Ainsworth, Indian Tribes Form New Alliance, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Jan. 21, 1998, at A3 [hereinafter Alliance]. 
179. CALIFORNIA NEVADA INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, SUMMER 1996 
QUARTERLY PUBLICATION, Vol. 1 iss. 1, 2 (1996) (periodical publication which keeps 
track of all Native American gaming issues in California and Nevada, and keeps track 
of voting records of Congress) [hereinafter CNIGA]. 
180. Id. at 2. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 3. 
184. CN !GA, supra note 179, at 2. 
185. Id. at 12. 
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In addition, gaming generates high rates of employment. 186 Native 
American individuals pay sales tax, federal income tax, FICA and social 
security taxes. 187 "Most Indians also pay state income and property 
tax. Only a small percentage of Indians who live and work on federally 
recognized reservations ... are exempt from paying state income and 
property tax." 188 The San Diego County casinos generate "more than 
$42 million in annual payrolls, with another $3 million in payroll 
taxes." 189 The San Manuel tribe generates $16.4 million annually in 
payroll, which comes out to $2 million in payroll taxes. 190 The 
Cabazon tribe has an annual payroll of $12 million. 191 Riverside 
County also benefits from the Morongo tribe, which has a $6 million 
annual payroll. 192 The Santa Ynez and the Jackson Tribes each bring 
in $4 million to their respective counties. 193 In Yolo County, the 
Rumsey tribe generated $10 million in payroll and benefits. 194 Along 
with employment and salary totals well over $100 million a year in the 
State of California, tribes also depend on outside services, and spend 
money on non-Native American business and distributors. 
Tribes buy products from surrounding businesses, which in tum 
creates more jobs, placing more money into the state economy. Between 
the seven tribes mentioned above, more than $108 million is spent 
annually on goods and services bought from local businesses and 
vendors. 195 Three of the tribes alone in San Diego County generate 
$64 million of the $108 million, excluding other tribes who have gaming 
operations which are not reflected here. 196 The state of California has 
decided not to engage in casino gaming, or reap the benefits that may 
derive from it. However, this state decision should not hinder tribes 
from gaming and in tum adding large amounts of money into the 
California economy. Because non-Native Americans cannot open 
casinos for the state to tax, the state of California should encourage the 
186. Non-Indians working at Native American casinos are taxed by the federal and 
state governments as they would be at any job. 
187. See supra note 6. 
I 88. See supra note 6. 
189. CNIGA, supra note 179, at 2. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 3. 
193. Id. at 3, 12. 
194. CNIGA, supra note I 79, at 3. 
195. Id. at 2-12. 
196. For illustrative purposes, only a handful of the tribes of California will be 
studied. ("Of California's 104 [recognized] tribes, about 40 operate casinos or plan to 
open them. These gaming operations, owned by Indians, have turned many impover-
ished reservations into prosperous enclaves." Ainsworth, Alliance, supra note 178). 
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receipt of the financial benefits from allowing tribes to engage in Class 
III gaming. 
Another benefit derived from prosperous Native American gaming is 
the generosity displayed by such tribes through community service. The 
seven mentioned tribes alone have decided to donate to many different 
organizations which provide needed services to people in their respective 
counties. In San Diego County, the Sycuan tribe donates to the San 
Diego Arthritis Foundation; the Barona tribe donates to the San Diego 
Symphony; and the Viejas tribe donates to local community charitable 
organizations. 197 Other tribes have donated to organizations across the 
state, and set up scholarship programs for the employees of the 
casinos, 198 
The above figures are just a small sample of what seven of the forty 
tribes who have decided to become involved in casinos in the state of 
California can do for the state economy. The tribes have made money 
for themselves through gaming, as well as deciding to help other 
communities, to which they are not legally obligated. The above-
outlined donations were made despite the fact that the state government 
197. CNIGA, supra note 179, at 2. 
198. Id. at 2-3, 12. In addition to donating extensively to the community, the 
Cabazon Tribe of Riverside County has built the first employer-sponsored day care 
facility in the Palm Springs area for employees of the casino. The Cabazon tribe has also 
been responsible for environmental projects, including three separate soil projects, which 
will help the local agricultural community. In addition, Riverside County has received 
$5 million from the Morongo tribe for supplementing support to local charities like the 
American Cancer Society, and underwriting of the local City of Banning's Stagecoach 
Days. The Santa Barbara County tribe, the Santa Ynez, contributed financially as well 
as in other ways to help the non-Native American population. Their casino employs forty 
percent non-Native Americans recruited from state and local job training programs, 
attracting national recognition for fair employment policies from the Private Industry 
Council, and the Job Training Network. Tribes in California contribute to a very diverse 
range of charities and causes, exemplifying their commitment to their surrounding 
communities. Another example is the Rumsey tribe which provides assistance to public 
safety departments in Yolo County, such as the Volunteer Fire Department, as well as 
to cultural and art organizations. Interested in the safety of the community, the tribe has 
contributed more than $130,000 to the Yolo County Sheriff's Department alone. The 
tribes are interested in the well-being of the next generations as well. The Jackson tribe 
has emphasized an interest in youth with over a $100,000 contribution to youth programs 
in the community, to organizations such as Boy Scouts and Little League Baseball, and 
an $8000 donation given to the local "Say No to Drugs" publication put out by local law 
enforcement. The Jackson tribe also holds the elderly in high regard and supports Senior 
Center projects. Id. 
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has historically made life difficult for the tribes of California. 199 The 
time has now come for the state government, the federal government, or 
the people of the state of California and other states to initiate helpful 
solutions to rectify the history of the Native Americans of this coun-
try.200 
PART V 
THE DISCREPANCY OF THE IGRA WHEN COMPARED TO PRECEDENT, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY LAW 
Part I above, including the Indian Commissioner's letter,201 illustrat-
ed that the removal process devastated the Native American populations 
in the 18OO's. The sections of the United States Constitution202 
explicitly stated and implied that Congress and the federal government 
would be the governmental entity to deal with tribes. Furthermore, the 
general federal policy towards Native Americans has been to not 
interfere with tribal sovereignty.203 This began with Cherokee v. 
Georgia, where the Court made clear that, Native Americans were to be 
considered "domestic dependent nations" under the protection of the 
federal government.204 McClanahan v. Arizana State Tax Commission 
specified that state law could intrude only if there is no interference with 
tribal self-government, and only if non-Native Americans were 
involved.205 In Williams v. Lee, the Court held that state law may 
intrude on Native American tribes only where essential tribal relations 
were not involved_2Cl6 Public Law 280 essentially allowed states to 
interfere with tribal jurisdiction when a law was criminal/prohibitory, 
versus civil/regulatory.207 Most importantly, the California v. Cabazon 
decision held that the states could not regulate gaming on Native 
American reservations.208 Cabazon gave Native Americans the power 
to conduct gaming on reservations notwithstanding state opinion, 
199. See infra Part IV. 
200. See generally WALDMAN, supra note 3; JOSEPHY, supra note 4 (discussion of 
the history of Native Americans). 
20 I. HEIZER supra note 26. 
202. See supra note 45. 
203. See supra Part II (discussing the relationship and responsibility that the federal 
government has with Native American tribes). 
204. Cherokee, 30 U.S. I (1831). 
205. McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (I 973). 
206. Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
207. See Public Law 280, supra note 79. 
208. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
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apparently making politicians nervous enough that one year later federal 
legislation was passed to put the control of what types of games would 
be allowed on reservation casinos into the hands of the state govern-
ments. 209 
Based on federal judicial decisions summarized above and statutory 
law, the general intent was to protect Native Americans and their 
remaining land from state authority. The federal government wanted the 
tribes to become self-sufficient and sovereign, while the federal 
government looked over their shoulders as a guardian. 
The above cases illustrate that interference by a state government that 
affected tribal self-government,210 or interfered with essential tribal 
relations211 had historically been frowned upon by the courts. There-
fore, logic dictates that a state may not now attempt to regulate gambling 
on reservations.212 However, contrary to the general historical intent 
to protect the tribes of the United States from the individual states, 
Congress passed a piece of inconsistent legislation which seemingly 
ignored one-hundred and fifty-six years of case law, and handed over the 
economic welfare of Native American tribes to state governments by 
allowing the states to have control over whether Native Americans 
practiced gaming on Native American land. 213 Much of the past law 
points to the conclusion that the role of the federal government is as 
guardian of Native Americans.214 Such cases also conclude that the 
federal government may pass laws to give states some regulatory power, 
but the case law states that such power be regulatory, and not interfere 
with tribal self-sufficiency.215 The IGRA is interfering with that self-
sufficiency for the tribes of California. 
The IGRA is inconsistent with past court decisions in allowing states 
to interfere with integral tribal relations, and allowing states to regulate 
209. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B) and (C) (1994) (mandating that Class III 
gaming be allowed only if located within a state that permits such gaming, and if the 
tribe enters into an agreement with the state). 
210. McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
211. Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
212. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 221. 
213. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). 
214. The author recognizes that there is also case law that has allowed the federal 
government to infringe on the rights of Native Americans. See generally United States 
v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
215. McClanahan, 41 I U.S. at 164; Bryan v. Itasca County Minnesota, 426 U.S. 
373 (1976). 
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gaming, which is a civil/regulatory matter, notwithstanding that the state 
allows gaming within its borders. Class III gaming requires that the 
states and the tribes form a compact essentially giving a state regulatory 
control of whether a tribe can enter into the most profitable class of 
gaming, which is completely contrary to the historical relationship 
between the state government and the tribes.216 Congress set forth the 
principal goal of the IGRA policy "promoting tribal economic develop-
ment, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government."217 The 
Governor of California is refusing to meet this policy by refusing to 
compact in good faith with the individual tribes. 218 According to the 
Declaration of Policy in the IGRA, its goal is "to provide a statutory 
basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of 
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong 
tribal governments."219 The autonomy given to the tribes is contradict-
ed by giving the choice to engage in gaming to state governors who may 
have other interests. 
The IGRA could benefit tribes, but transferring decisional power to the 
states was contradictory to federal law, and the IGRA now needs to be 
rectified. 
PART VI 
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF ATTEMPTING TO DICTATE 
SOVEREIGN NATIONS 
The only way to make the IGRA issues disappear is to come up with 
some realistic solutions. The solutions here are not entirely original, but 
are entirely possible under the power of the federal government, state 
governments, and most importantly the citizens that make up the United 
States of America, including Native Americans.220 
The first viable solution for the Native American community in the 
state of California is amending the California State Constitution, and 
allowing Native Americans the freedom to engage in gambling as 
sovereign nations. By amending the State Constitution to "allow" 
gaming on the reservation, the gaming decision could effectively be 
taken out of the hands of one individual, the Governor, and placed in the 
216. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). 
217. Id.§ 2702(1). 
218. See supra Part III. 
219. 25 u.s.c. § 2702 (1994). 
220. Native Americans born in the United States are United States citizens by birth. 
8 U.S.C. § 140l(b) (1978). 
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hands of the individual tribes. In 1996, Senator Ken Maddy, R-Fresno, 
sought a constitutional amendment that would allow electronic gambling 
machines on the state's Native American reservations.221 To write the 
provision into the constitution, a two-thirds vote in the legislature and 
a vote of the people was needed, bypassing the requirement of the 
Governor's signature.222 Maddy's measure would have legalized 
around 12,000 poker and slot-type electronic gaming devices that were 
already in use at the state's tribal casinos. 223 The amendment would 
have authorized, "but not require[d] [Governor] Wilson to negotiate 
compacts with individual tribes to allow the electronic games."224 At 
the time Howard Dickstein, an attorney for several gaming tribes, was 
asked whether the tribes agreed with the measure, and he stated that the 
tribes generally supported the idea.225 
Two other gaming bills were introduced before Maddy's, and like 
Maddy's bill, both have failed. One bill brought by Senator Richard 
Polanco, D-Los Angeles, received only four votes short of the two-thirds 
majority needed in the Senate, and the other bill was brought by Senator 
Jim Battin, R-La Quinta, fell six votes short of a two-thirds majority 
needed in the Assembly.226 
Considering the almost successful attempts at amending the Constitu-
tion, Senator Polanco has decided to make another attempt.227 Senator 
Polanco's new amendment was introduced on September 13, 1997, and 
sought amendment of Section 19 of Article IV of the California 
Constitution.228 This amendment authorizes the establishment and 
221. Dan Smith, Maddy: Let Voters to Decide on Indian Gaming, PRESS-




225. Id. at A 11. 
226. Smith, supra note 22 I, at A 11. 
227. Cal. S.C.A. 21 (1997) (amendment to the California Constitution is pending 
in the California Senate). 
228. Id. Section 19 of Art. IV of the California Constitution now reads, 
(a) The Legislature has no power to authorize lotteries and shall prohibit the 
sale of lottery tickets in the State. 
(b) The Legislature may provide for the regulations of horse races and horse 
race meetings and wagering on the results. 
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (a) the Legislature by statute may authorize 
cities and counties to provide for bingo games, but only for charitable 
purposes. 
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operation of casinos on Native American lands located within the state 
that are under the jurisdiction of a federally recognized Native American 
tribe, by exempting certain gaming activities from specified constitution-
al restrictions pursuant to the terms of a gaming compact. It would 
exempt the tribe and the tribe's activities or facilities from any law 
prohibiting gambling or gambling-related activities. 229 The amendment 
would also add Article XXII, the Tribal Government Gaming Act of 
1998.230 This measure would still allow the governor to compact with 
the tribes.231 
Taking some control out of the Governor's hands is a positive attempt 
to benefit the tribes. However, the ideal situation would be a State 
Constitutional amendment, or a Federal Constitutional amendment, 
which takes all power to decide whether or not tribes will engage in 
gaming out of the government's hands, and places that power in the 
hands of each individual tribe. A constitutional amendment either to the 
California Constitution, or the United States Constitution, could 
effectively provide that all decisions pertaining to the self-sufficiency 
and self-determination of Native American tribes within the borders of 
the United States of America shall be made by the individual tribes in 
accordance with their customs and laws, so Jong as those decisions do 
not directly conflict with the laws of the United States, as evidenced by 
the contemporary national standards. An amendment transferring the 
decision-making powers to the tribes would return the sovereignty that 
Native Americans had before the state and federal governments 
colonized them. A constitutional amendment would enable the tribes to 
engage in gambling, as Nevada has so decided. 
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), there is authorized the establishment of 
a California State Lottery. 
( e) The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit casinos of 
the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey. 
CAL. CONST. art. IV, sec. (a)-(e). 
229. Id. 
230. This is how part of the introduced amendment would read if passed: 
Art. XXII Tribal Government Gaming Act of 1998: 
Sec. I. This article, together with subdivision (f) of Section 19 of Article 
IV, shall be known and may be cited as the Tribal Government Gaming 
Act of 1998. 
Sec. 2. The people of the State of California declare that the purpose of 
this Act is to support and preserve the right of federally recognized Indian 
tribal governments within California to continue to provide tribal 
economic development through the conduct of regulated gaming on Indian 
lands, which has been the primary source of jobs and relief from welfare 
on California Indian reservations for many years, and to resolve uncertain-
ties regarding the legal status of such gaming. 
Cal. S.C.A. 21 (1997). 
231. Id. 
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The people of the state of California would best effectuate a second 
solution to the problem through initiative.232 The people of California 
can place an initiative on the ballot.233 The initiative for a constitution-
al amendment could take the same form as the amendment outlined 
above. The possibility of an initiative passed by the people in favor of 
a constitutional amendment, either put on the ballot by politicians, or by 
petition, is not far-fetched. Bipartisan support for allowing Native 
American gaming has been present for years in California. 
In 1995, a Republican representative from the 75th District of 
California, Jan Goldsmith, said that voters support Native American 
gambling, and do not want to "wag(e] a new war against American 
Indians."234 Representative Goldsmith stated that "[a] recent survey 
uncovered overwhelming public support for tribal gaming, and there's 
good reason for it - reservation gaming is good for California."235 
In light of the fact that eighty percent of federal spending to assist tribes 
was to be cut at one time, the sentiment has been that reservation 
gaming should be encouraged by the state. 236 Refreshingly, Ms. 
Goldsmith was able to separate the issue of gaming in the State of 
California, and the right of tribes as sovereign nations to operate gaming 
on the reservations. 237 She felt, as a representative of the people of the 
75th District, that "we need to move through the debate to establish the 
legal, regulatory and fiscal framework that will give ... Native 
Americans the foundation to continue to operate their tribal-government 
gaming facilities unfettered from harassment. "238 The debate has 
attracted not only state representatives, but California Congresspeople in 
Washington D.C. as well. Representatives George Miller, D-California, 
and the late Sonny Bono, R-California, spoke out against the Justice 
Department's decision in April of 1997, which stated that Native 
American casino's electronic gambling operations should be shut down, 
232. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (a) (The initiative is the power of the electors to 
propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them). 
233. California law requires a petition signed by electors equal in number to eight 
percent of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election to 
place a Constitutional amendment initiative on the ballot. Id. at (b). 






because they believed that the decision would interfere in the small 
amount of negotiations that had taken place.239 
The support of local and statewide politicians is important, but what 
is more important is that the people of the United States and California 
overwhelmingly support the right of Native Americans to allow gaming 
on reservations. 240 A nationwide Harris Poll asking 1,205 adults from 
across America, excluding Nevada and New Jersey, their feelings on 
casino gambling on Indian reservations, found that more than seventy 
percent believed Indian people should be allowed to operate casinos on 
the reservations.241 In 1995, J. Moore Methods Inc. Poll, of Sacramen-
to, found that sixty to seventy-three percent of voters back reservation 
casinos, with seventy-five percent backing the continued operation of 
gaming on Native American reservations.242 The J. Moore Methods 
Poll exemplified a pattern which had been identified since 1993 when 
a poll conducted by Field Research Corporation showed that more than 
sixty percent of Californians favored expanding gaming on reserva-
tions.243 The above polls not only show what the voters want, but also 
what the voters do not want. Fifty-eight percent of voters oppose 
Governor Pete Wilson's position of not negotiating gaming compacts 
with California tribes.244 
In addition, most voters feel that Native American gaming should not 
be restricted by government regulations, which backs an initiative to take 
the gaming issue out of state government hands. 245 The people of 
California across party lines agree with gaming, and what gaming does 
for Native Americans: "Seventy-nine percent of Republican male voters 
in California agree tribal government gaming is good .. ,"246 "eighty-
five percent of Republican women agree that [Native Americans], not 
state government, should be accountable for keeping tribal gaming free 
of corruption,"247 and "seventy-three percent of Democratic women 
239. David Safford, Lawmakers Question Wisdom of Order to Pull Plug on 
Electronic Gambling, LEGI-SLATE NEWS SERVICE, April 21, 1997, at 1. 
240. VIEJAS BAND OF KUMEYAAY INDIANS, PRESS INFORMATION PACKET, at Public 
Support Section (1997) (describing the tribe and outlining tribal sovereignty, gaming, and 
tribal development) (unpublished but copy on file with author). 
241. See id. 
242. See id. 
243. See id. 
244. See id. 
245. See VIEJAS BAND OF KUMEYAAY INDIAN, supra note 240 (The J. Moore 
Methods Inc. survey illustrates that point when seventy percent of voters say that they 
think gaming needs no additional government regulations, and more than fifty percent 
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voters agree with the use of gaming revenue to improve life on the 
reservations,"248 With the widespread support for Native American 
gaming on reservations, Attorney General Dan Lungren will probably 
think twice about running a Governor's race with the same attitudes Pete 
Wilson has shown for the Native Americans,249 Both Governor Pete 
Wilson and State Attorney General Dan Lungren "steadfastly have 
refused to negotiate compacts to permit the use of video gambling 
machines by Native Americans,"250 Their argument is that state law 
does not permit video gambling, and therefore the state does not have to 
compact with tribes, 251 
The argument appears hypocritical in the eyes of groups supporting 
gaming in light of the wide amount of computerized lottery games, and 
other state-sponsored games of chance,252 If the states, under the 
IGRA, allow lotteries and parimutuel wagering, casino games, slot 
machines electronic facsimiles of games of chance and banking card 
games, that state must compac with tribes,253 Now that Governor 
Wilson has signed a compact with a tribe, he is admitting through his 
actions that he is not against gambling, just gambling that will generate 
substantial income for the Native Americans, 254 If the Governor and 
the State Attorney cannot follow federal law in good faith, then the time 
has come for the people to enact a law which is easy to follow, gives the 
tribes the sovereignty they deserve, and puts all the decision making 
tools that the individual tribes need for self-determination back in the 
hands of the tribes, In fact, this is exactly what the tribes have decided 
to do,255 An initiative that would permit an unlimited number of slot 
machines, pay five to six percent of net winnings into trust funds 
earmarked for non-gaming reservations, and give the state thirty days to 
248, Id. 
249. See Alan Bersin, Resolving the Indian Gaming Problem, SAN DIEGO UNION 
TRIB., June 26, 1996, at B7 (discussion of the State of California Native American 
gaming issue from the perspective of the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District, and the negative sentiments of Pete Wilson and Dan Lungren). 
250. Id. 
251. See id. 
252. See id. 
253. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 2710 (1994). 
254. See Sweeney & Barfield, supra note 146 (discussing the fact that the machines 
Wilson wants to approve are not as fast or as profitable as the existing games). 
255. See Sweeney, Alliance Rejection, supra note 151. 
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approve any compact from a tribe, was submitted in January. 256 When 
asked about the initiative, Mary Ann Andreas, tribal chair of the 
Morongo commented that the tribes hope that "the public will see that 
not only has tribal sovereignty been trampled on here, but democracy, 
which everyone should be concerned with, has been trampled on."257 
If the solutions put forth so far seem too high-minded, then Congress 
needs to take control and amend the IGRA to adhere to what history has 
dictated, by taking all reference to state power over Native American 
sovereignty out of the statute, or by repealing the entire statute and 
starting over. Changes to the IGRA have been contemplated since its 
conception in 1988, showing a chance for compromise and changes in 
the IGRA which would benefit the Native Americans.258 In 1995, 
Senators John McCain, R-Arizona, and Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, wanted 
to create a stronger, independent federal agency to enforce federal 
standards for Native American gaming.259 The amendment would have 
also limited the states' ability to "put up roadblocks to Indian garn-
bling."260 The amendment would have mandated that if a state refused 
to negotiate a compact within 180 days, then the Secretary of the Interior 
Department could be asked to end the impasse.261 President 
Gaiashkibos, President of the National Congress of American Indians, 
stated that "[ w ]e will continue to speak out against any legislation ... 
that infringes on tribal sovereignty, but we will also applaud efforts to 
provide reasonable measures to ensure the long-term viability and 
integrity of Indian gaming."262 The time has come to speak up against 
the IGRA when governors, such as Pete Wilson, refuse to negotiate in 
good faith. Given the willingness to amend the IGRA, an amendment 
that would bar state involvement in the gaming process of the tribes 
seems to be the best solution. An amendment to the IGRA would align 
256. See id. 
257. Id. See James P. Sweeney, Tribes Gather 800,000 Names For Gaming Vote, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 21, 1998, at A3. 
258. See generally Karen S. McFadden, The Stakes Are Too High to Gamble Away 
Tribal Self-Government, Self-Sufficiency, and Economic Development When Amending 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 J. CORP. L. 807, 821 (1996) (discussing the 
amendment of the Tribal-State Compacting Process); Edward P. Sullivan, Reshuffling the 
Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 45 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1107, 1156 (1995) (discussing positive and negative amendments which had been 
discussed up until 1996). 
259. See Keith White, Lawmakers Push Indian Gaming Act Amendment: Tribes, 
States Haggle, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, June 22, 1995, at 2. 
260. Mitchell Zuckoff, Congress to Take Up Changes to Indian-Casino Law, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 1995, at 48. 
261. See id. 
262. White, supra note 259, at 2. 
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it with past federal case law, 263 and allow the tribes to have the 
sovereignty to make the decisions effecting their self-sufficiency and 
self-government befitting the "findings" section of the IGRA.264 
Another solution that has entered the controversy is a set of guidelines 
drafted by the Secretary of the Interior which would let him approve 
Native American casinos over the objection of governors and the elected 
officials who do not want tribal gaming in their states.265 The new 
guidelines lay out a step-by-step process through which tribes might 
apply directly to the Interior Secretary for gaming compacts. Tribes 
could pursue that option only after states refuse to negotiate, then refuse 
to be sued for it. 266 Secretary Babbitt's reasoning for establishing the 
guidelines is to give the tribes a remedy under the IGRA, which was 
taken away from them in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Seminole Nation 
v. Florida. 267 Tribes have complained that the decision left them no 
recourse when states refuse to bargain in good faith. 268 However, 
disagreement has come to the forefront as to whether the new guidelines 
will necessarily assist the tribes in California. Howard Dickstein, an 
attorney for the Pala Band of Native Americans stated that, the "position 
[ of the Secretary] is very close to the position that was advocated by the 
states," and furthermore, while the new guidelines "could get the tribes 
a compact, it does not appear that it's going to get tribes a different 
scope of gaming, an expanded scope of gaming."269 Mr. Dickstein's 
opinion however, is not shared by all. 270 
Mark Nichols, the chief executive officer of the Cabazon Indians of 
Indio said that even though Governor Wilson has refused to negotiate a 
263. See supra Part 11-B (discussing the history of case law). 
264. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). 
265. See Chet Barfield, U.S. Drafts Guidelines for Indian Gambling; Designed to 
End Impasse With States, SAN DIEGO UNJON-TRTB., Dec. 23, 1997, at A3. 
266. See id. 
267. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, (1996) (holding that: (I) 
Congress lacked authority under the Indian commerce clause to abrogate the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (2) the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908)---eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution does not bar federal 
actions against state officials for their official actions-----did not apply in light of intricate 
remedial provisions of the IGRA). 
268. See Barfield, supra note 265. 
269. Id. 
270. See Mark Henry, State's Gaming Tribes Drafting Alternative Model For 
Casino Pact, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 23, 1997, at Al2 (Mark Nichols coming to a 
different conclusion than Howard Dickstein). 
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compact based on his belief that video slot machines are illegal in 
California, Nichols feels that the federal government would allow video 
gambling in California because of the present existence of the state 
lottery which is a form of electronic gaming.271 Whatever the out-
come, the main objective is to create a level playing field for tribes 
when states refuse to negotiate.272 The new guidelines have of course 
stirred up some controversy from state representatives who feel that the 
state of Nevada may lose money. 
Senator Richard Bryan, D-Nevada, has expressed concern for what he 
has termed "the floodgates for tribal casinos in California."273 Senator 
Bryan apparently feels that a compact with California tribes would 
threaten the Nevada gaming industry.274 In addition, the Governor of 
Nevada feels the same way, calling Babbitt's proposal "disastrous for 
Nevada," considering the "fact that California provides a majority of the 
Nevada market."275 The fears of the Nevada Governor are unfounded 
to date, since no reports of any negative impact on Nevada gaming from 
California tribal gaming have surfaced.276 In addition, California 
should not take into account whether California's moneymaking 
endeavors, such as gaming, which economically benefit its citizens, will 
adversely effect Nevada's ability to make money. 
Secretary Babbitt's concern for the Native Americans comes none too 
soon, as California's refusal has also driven tribes to draft their own 
version of a casino pact.277 One such tribally-drafted pact would 
require sharing winnings with surrounding communities and police, in 
an effort to boost economic growth. 278 The refusal of Governor 
Wilson to compact in good faith under the IGRA, and his proposal to 
put a statewide cap on the number of gaming devices, has driven the 
California tribes to propose their own compact. 279 Something must be 
done to allow Native Americans to continue on the road to sovereignty, 
271. See id. 
272. See Barfield, supra note 265, at A4. 
273. Tony Batt, Plan Gives Final OK to Babbitt, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 6, 1997, 
at IA. 
274. See id. 
275. Id. 
276. When the comment was written there had been no reports on whether any 
negative ramifications from Native American gaming in California had effected the 
Nevada gaming industry. 
277. See Henry, supra note 270, at A 12. 
278. See id. 
279. See id. 
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and the Secretary and the tribes are taking the initiative, in light of the 
refusal of Governor Wilson to negotiate in good faith, 280 
The above solutions are just a few that will reinstate tribal control over 
the economic issues that the tribes must address to continue on the road 
to complete sovereignty, 281 
PART VII 
CONCLUSION 
To enable the Native American people of California to thrive once 
again, and to comply with the purpose of the relationship between the 
Native American people and the federal government, Native Americans 
must be given the opportunity to live as sovereign nations, The IGRA 
has not fared well for the tribes in California, or for the state of 
California, The IGRA has slowed down the economic development of 
California tribes who want to expand, and allowed the Governor of 
California to control the future of tribal economics, In addition, the 
IGRA is inconsistent with past case law and the Constitution of the 
United States, The benefits conferred on Native American communities, 
as well as non-Native American communities through Native American 
gaming, cannot be ignored, Considering that gaming is positive for the 
people of California and for Native American gaming communities, and 
considering that the IGRA is inconsistent with past law, the only feasible 
legal avenues are for the federal government to either remain a 
protective guardian for Native American tribes, or allow the tribes to 
have control of all tribal relations as sovereign nations. Similarly, states 
also have a choice and could allow the individual tribes within their 
280. It is the author's opinion that the Pala compact which was with one small non-
gaming tribe, which many other tribes disagree with, is not a compact of "good faith". 
See supra note I 46 ( discussing tribal displeasure with the compacting negotiations). 
281. The Ninth Circuit recently decided a case that could effectively deter 
Governors from negotiating in bad faith because of a moral dilemma with Class III 
gaming by tribes. In United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F. 3d 1297 (9th Cir. 
1998), the court held that Class III gaming provisions under the IGRA cannot form the 
basis for an injunction against a tribe. The court found that before the lower court can 
permit enforcement against a gaming tribe, it must engage in a factual investigation 
when there are allegations that the state has engaged in bad faith negotiations, or has 
refused to bargain at all. 
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states to decide for themselves whether to begin or how to continue 
gaming. 
Native American people in California deserve a chance to be 
economically independent, and develop the communities within the 
reservation lands that the Native Americans reserved when the rest of 
their lands were taken. It is up to the lawmakers and the people of the 
state of California to provide them the autonomy they deserve. 
GREGORY ELVINE-KREIS 
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